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’Which Multiverse?’: Some FAQ
M. Dugic´1 and J. Jeknic´-Dugic´2
Recently, we pointed out the possible inconsisntency in the very foundations
of the Everett MWI (or a Multiverse) theory. Here, we place some emphasis
on the very basic notions underlying our conclusion yet motivated by certain,
recently raised clever observations in this regard.
1. It is all about the standard quantum mechanics
Our analysis [1] is the standard and pure (nonrelativistic) quantum mechan-
ics. On this basis, we start [1] with the general assumptions of MWI and we
investigate some consequences.
We are interested in the standard linear canonical transformations (LCT)
that, due to linearity, allow the inverse transformations likewise the direct
quantization. The LCT we are interested in are global–they do not leave any
degree of freedom of a World intact. As a consequence, a composite system
W is differently decomposed into subsystems, e.g. S +E =W = S ′ +E ′. It
simultaneously, directly and without any additional requirements givesN :
a. the W’s Hilbert state space H decomposes as
HS ⊗HE = H = HS′ ⊗HE′, (1)
b. the state |Φ〉 of W in an instant of time t◦ can also be differently decom-
posed, in general, as:
∑
i
ci|i〉S|i〉E = |Φ〉 =
∑
α
dα|α〉S′|α〉E′ (2)
c. the Hamiltonian Hˆ of W can also be decomposed as:
HˆS + HˆE + HˆSE = Hˆ = HˆS′ + HˆE′ + HˆS′E′. (3)
To see the physical relevance of these notions remind the quantum the-
ory of the hydrogen atom. There, the ”electron (e)” and ”proton (p)” are
exchanged by the ”center-of-mass (CM)” and the ”relative particle (R)” sys-
tems (every possible textbook). As to the later, the absence of the interac-
tion allows the variables separation and the exact solution to the Schrodinger
equation for R. i.e. for the internal degrees of freedom of the atom.
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So, our first claim reads: the standard and universally valid quantum
mechanics allows, and sometimes (for the formal, mathematical reasons) re-
quires the different decomposition of a composite system into subsystems,
unconditionally–as formally given by eqs. (1)-(3). ALL THE TIME WE
DEALWITH ONE ANDONLYONE COMPOSITE SYSTEM,W, for which
we believe objectively to exist. E.g., CM + R (but not ”e + p”) is what we
observe for the hydrogen atom in the bound states, while:
|ψqp〉CM |nlmlms〉R = Hatom =
∑
ci|i〉e|i〉p, (4)
where the r.h.s. refers to the decomposition e(lectron)+ p(roton) that bears
entanglement due to the non-zero (Coulomb) interaction; ψqp may be a wave
packet determined by the mean position and momentum values, q and p,
respectively.
In respond to Meeker [2, 3]: the expression eq. (3) is unconditional
(no ”the time-like separate regions” is required in order eq. (3) to be valid),
while referring to one and only one (yet a composite) physical systemW–such
as the hydrogen atom.
2. In accordance with MWI
We adopt [1] the basic notion of MWI on decoherence as follows: decoherence
is a sufficient3 condition for the (approximate) classical reality (and struc-
ture) of the World(s). The ”pointer basis” is determined by the interaction
[4], and there is not any conceptual or substantial distinction between the
exact and the only-approximate pointer bases (the proof is simple yet to be
presented elsewhere); e.g. the coherent state as present on the l.h.s. of eq.
(4) is an element of an overcomplete, non-orthogonal basis states. Of course,
the (realistic) approximate separability of the interaction [4] gives rise to
approximate pointer basis.
Of course: it is possible that decoherence is not a sufficient condition–and
this may ”save” the MWI (cf. footnote 4).
Again, in respond to Meeker [2, 3]: our analysis [1] equally refers to
the exact as well as to the approximate (approximately orthogonal) pointer
basis. [The later naturally takes into account the ”nonideal” quantum measu-
rements–in the modern literature recognized (and termed) yet as the ”back
action”.]
3. Some other questions
3Our best theories say it is also a necessary condition.
2
i) We fix [1] the instant of time t◦ for several reasons. The answers below
constitute the answers to the questions raised mainly by King [5].
First, by fixing the instant of time, we uniquely define the quantum state
of a unique W–without the assumption of the unique time instant, eq. (2)
loses its physical sense and meaning, when one can not even define the
World’s future dynamics. The analysis [1] refers equally to every possible
World and to every possible instant of time. Second, the unique state of W
determines the unique state for every decomposition of W in every instant
of time. Third, the unique state of W in every instant of time determines
its (future) dynamics–this is the issue of the World’s identity within the
consistent-history approach. On this basis, one can question [1] the splitting
of the World W that starts in a properly defined instant of time t◦–the split-
tings referring to the different time instants are not interesting for us (except
in the general context of the identity of the Worlds in the consistent-history
approach to MWI that, cf. Section 2, we do not question).
ii) Looking for the ”’maximally compatible basis’ over all the interactions”
is poorly stated yet intelligent a question [5].
MWI (and so do we [1]) deals with the ”relative states”. In this context,
the ’maximally compatible basis’ is just another set of the relative states–
referring to yet another decomposition of the World. In other words: MWI
does not exist without the Everett ”relative states”, while their introduction
automatically calls for another (one out of the plenty of the possible) de-
compositions of the World into subsystems. So, there is not some ”average”
pointer basis, unless we abandon the very basis of MWI, i.e. the concept
of the ”relative states” and the corresponding (macroscopic) structure of the
World.
4. Justifying the main conclusion. Some open questions
It is easy to demonstrate the formal existence of the global LCTs implement-
ing eqs. (1)-(3), i.e. to formally introduce the ”Worlds” bearing the similar
global structure (decomposition etc.) as the world we live in. So, the main
argument stemming from eq. (2) [1] remains valid yet alternatively (more
intuitively) expressed:
either the decoherence effect is not sufficient (while we still assume it is a
necessary condition) for the (approximate) classical reality of an open system,
or the MWI, while being sensitive to the variations of the Worlds’ global
structure, should be abandoned.
NOW, one may ask about the alternatives to MWI.
The only answer4 we have (the details to be presented elsewhere) is as
4That still assumes the decoherence effect is sufficient for the classical reality, while not
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follows: following quantum mechanics, i.e. eqs. (1)-(3), the different de-
compositions (bearing yet the internal decoherence) should be considered
to be equally realistic–the relativity of the basic concept of ’system’ [6, 7].
Interestingly enough, this NEW kind of the PARALLEL UNIVERSES (non-
Everettian parallel universes (NEPU)), while having nothing in common with
MWI, can5 dynamically INFLUENCE each other6! This is a consequence of
the fact (cf. above) that we have the uniquely defined, non-splitting World
in an instant of time t◦
7.
NThe task of obtaining the r.h.s. of eq. (2) from the l.h.s. and vice
versa is in general a tough matter. For some simple models it can be shown
that some LCT inevitably transform a separable into an entangled state [8]
while the exact form of the entangled state is not easy to obtain; the reverse
is an NP-problem. On the other side, in general, the LCT can change the
symmetry of the composite-system’s Hamiltonian. So, formally, investigating
the transformations eqs. (1)-(3) is challenging an issue.
NEPU Ontology. There is only one Universe and only one Time as well
as only one physical fundamental Law and the only one Universal quantum
state of the Universe. [The Law may be the Schrodinger law, or the ”ob-
jective collapse”, or...] There are the different possible decompositions of
the Universe into subsystems. Whilst mutually conditioned (by the ”relative
states” concept), the subsystems belonging to the same division should still
be subject to decoherence. Then all such divisions (the NEPU) are classically
realistic and simultaneously existing, i.e. sharing the same physical time.
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a priori rejecting the ”objective collapse”.
5Assuming the presence of the intelligent beings in the alternative decompositions.
6An action of an intelligent being in one decomposition, considered NOT as a sponta-
neous dynamics, inevitably lays ”ghostly” a mark on the dynamics of all the other worlds.
7It can not be overepmhasized: eq. (2) emphasizes the one and only one quantum
state of W in every instant of time–i.e. the unique quantum state for every possible
decomposition of W into subsystems.
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